We consider the classical micro-economic foundation of discrete choice, additive random utility models, with conditional utilities depending on expenditure on the numéraire. We show that signs of own-and cross-price effects are identified on the basis of the primal problem only, and Giffen behaviour is ruled out. For the translog specification, we prove that the alternative with highest price behaves as normal good, and the alternative with lowest price behaves as inferior good. We establish conditions for equivalence between the primal and the dual problem. We provide a discrete choice version of the Slutsky equation which, similarly to divisible goods, decomposes the own-price effect into a substitution and an income effect.
Introduction
Classical consumer theory, which deals with divisible goods, does not restrict how demand changes when price changes, since Giffen goods are not ruled out, or how demand changes when income changes, since both normal and inferior goods are contemplated. Duality provides results that are useful to determine how these two kinds of changes interact.
Duality deals with the relationships between the primal problem, i.e. the utility maximisation under a budget constraint, and the dual problem, i.e. the expenditure minimisation under a utility constraint. Duality is well established. A rigorous treatment is found in micro-economics textbooks by Mas-Colell et al. [1] and Luenberger [2] .
Central to duality is the expenditure function, introduced by McKenzie [3] . It is based on the idea, anticipated by Allen [4] and Hicks [5] , of a compensating behaviour, consisting in an adjustment of income which keeps the consumer, when prices change, on the same indifference locus. Two key results of duality that reveal properties of price and income effects are the primal-dual equivalence and the Slutsky equation. The equivalence property establishes that: 1) the minimum expenditure, required to achieve the maximum utility achievable with a given income y, is the same income y, and 2) the maximum utility, achievable with the minimum expenditure required to achieve utility level u, is the same utility u. When equivalence holds, the same bundle of goods maximises utility and minimises expenditure, i.e. Marshallian demand equals Hicksian demand.
The Slutsky equation is a consequence of the equivalence property and the Shepard's lemma. The equation establishes the relationship between the price derivative of the Marshallian demand and the price derivative of the Hicksian demand. Based on this, the marginal effect of a price change is decomposed into a substitution effect, which accounts for the impact at constant utility, and an income effect, which accounts for the impact of the change in real income, the one that occurs when all prices are held constant. The Slutsky equation provides the theoretical justification of the law of demand. This states that the demand response of a normal good to a marginal price increase is negative.
The aim of this note is to extend to discrete choice, the results on price and income effects that in classical consumer theory are provided by duality.
Discrete choice models are usually derived from the assumption of random utility maximisation. A first presentation of the discrete choice, random utility counterpart of classical consumer theory, was provided by McFadden [6] . His approach considers that dependence on economic variables, i.e. prices of the alternatives and income, is through the systematic part of the utilities, and that random terms are independent of observable variables. The latter property defines the class of additive random utility models (ARUMs). All subsequent developments relating to the micro-economic properties of random utility models have been cast within this framework 1 . The results in McFadden relate to the primal problem. Among these, there is a qualification of the dependence of systematic utilities on the expenditure on the numéraire as sufficient condition for consistency with Roy's identity.
Dagsvik and Karlström [7] provided a first treatment of the dual problem for ARUMs. They introduce definitions of the random expenditure function and Hicksian probabilities, together with a treatment of the Shepard's lemma. Under the usual interpretation of ARUMs that regards the random terms as individual specific, the random expenditure assumes the meaning of an individual-specific expenditure function. The Hicksian probabilities assume the meaning of shares in a population, with homogeneous systematic utilities, where income is being compensated, or, equivalently, expenditure is being minimised, by each individual. Duality in ARUMs has a theoretical interest per se. The extension of duality to a two-period setting, dealt with by Dagsvik and Karlström [7] and Delle Site [8] , is useful for welfare measurement.
To date, price and income effects in ARUMs are still largely unexplored. The note is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the micro-economic foundation of ARUMs, with the formulation of the primal and the dual problem. Section 3 provides properties of price and income effects based on the primal problem. Section 4 establishes the ARUM counterparts of the primal-dual equivalence and the Slutsky equation. Section 5 concludes highlighting commonalities and differences between the divisible good and the discrete choice case.
Micro-Economic Foundation

The Primal Problem
An individual, endowed with income y, consumes a discrete good and a numéraire representing a composite good. The discrete good includes a set of J mutually exclusive alternatives. Given the utility-maximising behaviour subject to a constraint on income spent, when alternative i is chosen the individual will be characterised by a conditional indirect utility function i u . The utility i u is expressed by the additively separable structure: u satisfies all the properties to qualify as an indirect utility according to classical consumer theory: continuity in price and income, homogeneity of degree 0 in price and income (since prices and income are deflated), non increasing monotonicity in price, non decreasing monotonicity in income, quasi-convexity in price 2 . In addition, each conditional indirect utility i u should generate the demand for the discrete good via Roy's identity. To achieve this, a sufficient condition is that ( )
, i w y p has a functional form in residual income
in the expenditure on the numéraire. In the following, we will assume that this property is satisfied.
In this case we have:
The primal problem (PP) consists in finding the alternative of maximum utility:
It is easily seen, because of the assumptions made on the conditional indirect utilities i u , 1, , i J =  , that the maximum utility U possesses all the properties to qualify as an indirect utility: it is continuous in prices and income, homogenous of degree 0 in prices and income, non increasing in prices and non decreasing in income, quasi-convex in prices. Also, it generates via Roy's identity the demand for the discrete good:
The case without income effects, i.e. where income does not affect choice, is obtained when the systematic utilities are linear in residual income with a coefficient that does not depend on alternative, since in this case income cancels out of the maximum function:
The form commonly used in applied work when income effects are considered is the translog (Herriges and Kling [10] ; Tra [11] ):
The translog form has the following, desirable, properties. The marginal utility of income depends on the alternative and is inversely related to residual income, being
The intuition is that a dollar has a higher value when the budget available for other expenses is lower. The marginal utility of income decreases with income, which is consistent with the intuition that a dollar provides a decreasing utility as income rises. In addition, if income increases, the difference in utilities of two alternatives with different prices, ceteris paribus, decreases, which means that the difference in market shares decreases too. The intuition is that with higher income the difference in price has a lower impact on demand. Finally, the form ensures that residual income is positive, since so is the argument of a logarithm, a property which is of relevance in the treatment of duality because it implies that compensated income also is positive.
The assumption on the probability distribution of the J-variate random vector 3 . Let the random vector ε be characterized by a probability density function ( )
In the primal problem, the individual chooses the alternative of maximum utility. The (Marshallian) choice probability i P is the probability that alternative i is the alternative of maximum utility. Consider the event i S that alternative i is the alternative of maximum utility:
S is a set in the space J R of the random terms. Therefore: 2 A function ( ) f x is quasi-convex on a set C if the sub-level sets are convex, i.e. if for any choice of 1 2 ,
. A monotonic function of one variable is also quasi-convex (Beer [12] ). 3 Random terms are denoted by ε , specific values by η .
( ) ( ) ( )
where I is the indicator function.
In ARUMs, the derivative of the expectation [ ] U E of the maximum utility U with respect to the systematic utility of one alternative equals the probability of that alternative:
Williams [13] and Anderson et al. [14] provide a proof of Equation (6) based on differentiation of the expectation of the maximum utility, while Fosgerau et al. [9] provide a proof based on the expression of the expectation of a random variable in terms of its cumulative distribution function. Each conditional expenditure function i m satisfies all the properties to qualify as an expenditure function according to classical consumer theory: continuity in price and in the utility level u, homogeneity of degree 1 in price, non decreasing monotonicity in price and in u, concavity in price. In addition, each conditional expenditure function i m generates the demand for the discrete good via Shepard's lemma:
The Dual Problem
The dual problem (DP) consists in finding the alternative of minimum expenditure:
It is easily seen that the minimum expenditure M possesses all the properties to qualify as an expenditure function: it is continuous in prices and in the utility level u, homogeneous of degree 1 in prices, non decreasing in prices and in u, concave in prices 4 . Also, it generates the demand for the discrete good via Shepard's lemma:
Notice that, in a random setting, there is no reason why each conditional expenditure function i m , and hence the minimum expenditure M, should be positive. The individual, depending on her vector of random terms, may need to compensate to an extent to which she runs into debt (i.e. a negative i m ). In the model, this translates into the consumption of a negative amount of the composite good, a circumstance which does not alter the mathematical properties of the quantities of interest (utility and expenditure). However, with a translog specification of the systematic utilities as in Equation (4) ε . Therefore, the Hicksian choice probabilities can be expressed in terms of the probability density function of the random terms by:
Results Based on the Primal Problem
The following proposition provides properties of the own-and cross-price effects.
Proposition 1. In ARUMs, 1) the own-price effects are non-positive:
2) the cross-price effects are non-negative:
Proof. First, consider that, in ARUMs, the following hold: 1) the cross-systematic utility derivatives of probabilities are non-positive:
2) the own-systematic utility derivative of probabilities is non-negative:
Equation (12) is found in corollary 1 in Fosgerau et al. [9] . The proof is based on the properties that the expectation of the maximum utility exhibits as choice probability generating function.
Since we have 
By combining Equation (12) with Equation (14) we have that 0
, which is Equation (13) .
Since 0 i i v p ∂ ∂ < , because of the increasing monotonicity of systematic utility in residual income, we have:
□ Proposition 1 implies that in ARUMs Giffen behaviour is ruled out. The following proposition provides properties of income effects in ARUMs with a translog specification of the systematic utilities. (4), 1) the alternative with highest price behaves as normal good:
Proposition 2. In ARUMs with translog specification of the systematic utilities as in Equation
2) the alternative with lowest price behaves as inferior good:
Proof. By the chain rule of derivation (Sydsaeter et al. [16] ) we can write: 
Since the Hessian of the expectation of the maximum utility is symmetric and in the light of Equation (6) we have that (21) can be re-written as:
,
Recall that 0
Results Based on Duality
Primal-Dual Equivalence
The solution of the primal and dual problems is a locus of the random terms, i.e. a set in the J-dimensional Euclidean space J R , for each alternative. The primal and the dual problems are equivalent when, for each alternative, the locus solution to the problem is the same. Thus, equivalence implies equality of Marshallian and Hicksian probabilities.
The following proposition shows: 1) that the primal problem is equivalent to a dual problem with a properly defined utility level, and 2) that the dual problem is equivalent to a primal problem with a properly defined income level. For clarity of the exposition, we make explicit the income argument of the conditional utilities and of Marshallian probabilities using the notations It is proved that each individual makes an identical choice under the two behavioural models, i.e. i i ′ ′′ = . At the aggregate level, where the population of individuals is considered, it is proved that an identical sub-population makes choice i under the two behavioural models, i.e.
Notice that the equivalence is established with reference to a dual problem with individual-specific utility constraints. Similar arguments hold for part 2).
Based on proposition 3, we can re-formulate equivalence in the following terms. Corollary 1. In ARUMs: 1) the minimum expenditure, required to achieve the maximum utility with a given income y, is the same income y:
2) the maximum utility, achievable with the minimum expenditure required to achieve utility level u, is the same utility u: For part 2), consider the dual and suppose that i is the alternative of minimum expenditure:
Thus,
Then, because of the increasing monotonicity of systematic utilities in residual income, we have that i is also the alternative of maximum utility with income level equal to M:
Therefore we have
Slutsky Equation
A consequence of the equivalence property is the ARUM counterpart of the Slutsky equation, which establishes the relationship between the price derivative of the Marshallian probabilities and the price derivative of the Hicksian probabilities. 
Proof. By proposition 3, we can write: , where we have made explicit the price arguments in the Marshallian probabilities. By using the chain rule of derivation (Sydsaeter et al. [14] ), derivation with respect to i p leads to: (26) and (27) into Equation (25) we obtain:
, , , , , , □ Proposition 4 is proved with arguments that are similar to those used to prove Slutsky equation in classical consumer theory. This is because of the equivalence property which is similar in classical theory and ARUMs.
